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Researchers have argued that conceptualization of cognitive mechanisms that
underlie framing is vague and have proposed an applicability model to account for
cognitive processes contributing to framing effects (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).  The
applicability model assumes the central roles of schema and views framing effects as
applicability effects.  In particular, it assumes that media framing will only have an
effect if it resonates with pre-existing schemata held by audience members.
The study described in this thesis tests the applicability model and its
assumption of relevant schemata through a two-by-two experimental design.  Through
a national, computer assisted telephone survey of 781 respondents, the study utilizes a
split-ballot technique to measure the effects of two frames (regulation versus non-
regulation) on issues related to biotechnology and genetically modified food products.
A secondary manipulation, varying the order of schemata measures (frame first versus
schema measures first), tests the role of schemata in framing effects.  Causal
attributions, attributions of responsibility, and policy opinions are measured as
outcomes of the main manipulation, or framing effects.  Additional variables including
demographics, attention to science and technology news across three media, awareness
and support of biotechnology, and ideology were collected to control for and assess
other influences on the outcome variables.
Analyses included independent t-tests to look for differences between the four
experimental groups.  Respondents’ schematic strengths were assessed through six
measures.  Twelve measures assessed causal attributions, responsibility attributions,
and policy opinions toward regulation of biotechnology.
Results reveal that schemata are directly related to people’s attributions and
opinions on issues related to biotechnology and media attention is directly related to
schema development.  In particular, attention to science and technology news ontelevision, in newspapers, and on the Internet contributed to stronger Information
schemata, which emphasize the importance of science and research in determining the
risks and safety of genetically modified food products.  Television was the only
medium that was related to Regulation schemata, which emphasize regulation as a
necessity to protect consumers from the effects of biotechnology and preserve the
environment.
Framing effects occurred across particular schematic strength groups.  Two
different schematic groups were more likely to attribute risks associated with
biotechnology to global causes such as the nature of science and information if they
were exposed to the Non-Regulation frame, which emphasized that science and
research should determine if new regulations should be made.  Furthermore,
respondents with stronger schemata (medium Regulation and high Information
schematic strength) were more likely to agree with treatment as the cause of risk when
exposed to the Regulation frame, which argued that the FDA must require research and
create regulations to protect citizens from unsafe products.  However, differences in
Global attributions were not found across the seven other schematic groups.
Respondents with high Regulation schemas were more likely to attribute
responsibility to the government even when they were exposed to the Non-Regulation
frame.  Framing effects were not found for policy opinions and responsibility
attribution to other groups such as non-governmental groups, trade groups and private
corporations, and individuals.  These results suggest that schema determine to a large
extent, whether or not framing effects would occur and thus, provide some support for
the Applicability model of framing effects.
Furthermore, interaction effects were found between the main manipulation
(type of frame) and the secondary manipulation (order of schemata measures) for
particular schematic groups.  Framing of genetically modified foods influenced policyopinions for particular schemata groups that were exposed to the schema measures
after the frame manipulation, indicating that the content of schema measures may have
contributed further to framing effects.  Question order and possible priming effects are
discussed.
In sum, the results provide limited support for the Applicability model and
demonstrate the need for further research into the cognitive mechanisms that underlie
framing effects.  Future study can further illuminate the complexity of audience
schemas and their role in framing effects.  Understanding of these cognitive
mechanisms can be used in both development and political communication campaigns,
where message receptibility will depend on audience awareness and schematic
frameworks.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Yufen Chen began her graduate training in communication theory and research
at Cornell University in 2002.  Prior to graduate school, Yufen worked in advertising
and interactive marketing for five years.  She received her Bachelor’s degree from the
State University of New York at Buffalo in 1997 with dual majors in Psychology and
Communication.
iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The data for this project was obtained from an annual survey funded by the
Communication Department at Cornell University.  Dietram Scheufele, who was the
Chair of my committee and Associate Professor at the Communication Department,
supervised the study.  Dr. Scheufele is credited with the idea of using the Luntz report
as the foundation for the design of the frames.  This study was not possible without his
initial suggestions on study design and advisement during data collection.
Additionally, I would also like to thank Jim Shanahan, Associate Professor at
the Communication Department, for his comments during the initial design and
proposal stages, as well as Mike Traugott, Associate Professor at the University of
Michigan, for his suggestions on analysis of results.
A paper version of this thesis was submitted to the graduate student paper
competition at the World Association for Public Opinion Research conference and was
awarded the Naomi C. Turner Prize in May, 2004.
ivTABLE OF CONTENTS
Biographical sketch iii
Acknowledgements iv
Table of Contents v
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
Introduction 1
The Concept of Framing 2
The Concept of Schemata 7
Framing and Schemata 11
The Applicability Model of Framing Effects 12
The Current Study 15
Method and Design 19
Analyses and Results 28
Conclusions 42
Discussion 47
Appendix 51
Bibliography 67
vLIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1  33
Effect of frame on Treatment attribution for respondents
with low Regulation and medium Information schema strength
Figure 2 34
Effect of frame on Global attribution for respondents
with low Regulation and medium Information schema strength
Figure 3  36
Effect of frame on attributions of responsibility to government for respondents
with high Regulation and low Information schema strength
Figure 4  39
Effect of schema order on agreement with Non-regulatory policy for
respondents with low Regulation and low Information schema strength
who were exposed to the Regulation frame
Figure 5  40
Effect of schema order on agreement with Regulatory policy for
respondents with low Regulation and medium Information schema strength
who were exposed to the Non-regulation frame
viLIST OF TABLES
Table 1  23
Means and standard deviations for three measures:
attention across three media, awareness, and support to biotechnology
Table 2 24
Two by two experimental design
Table 3
Means and standard deviations for outcome variables 27
Table 4 30
Correlations between media attention, schema development,
awareness, support and perceived risk of biotechnology
Table 5 54
Differences between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with Global Attribution measures
Table 6 54
Differences between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with Treatment Attribution measures
viiTable 7  55
Differences between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to the U.S. government
and federal agencies
Table 8 55
Differences between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to independent,
or non-governmental organizations
Table 9 56
Differences between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to consumers
Table 10 56
Difference between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to private corporations and industry
trade groups
Table 11 57
Difference between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with Regulation Policies*
viiiTable 12 57
Difference between framed conditions by schema groups
Mean agreement with Information Policies*
Table 13 58
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Global Attribution measures
Table 14 58
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Treatment Attribution measures
Table 15 59
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to the U.S. government and federal
agencies
Table 16 59
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to independent, or non-governmental
organizations
ixTable 17 60
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to consumers
Table 18 60
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to private corporations and industry
trade groups
Table 19 61
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Regulation Policies
Table 20 61
Interactions between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Information Policies
Table 21 62
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Global Attribution measures
xTable 22 62
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Treatment Attribution measures
Table 23 63
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to the U.S. government and federal
agencies
Table 24 63
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to independent, or non-governmental
organizations
Table 25 64
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to consumers
xiTable 26 64
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with attributing responsibility to private corporations and industry
trade groups
Table 27 65
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Regulation Policies
Table 28 65
Interactions between the Regulation frame, schema order, and schema strength
Differences between schema order conditions by schema groups, controlling for frame
Mean agreement with Information Policies
xiiIntroduction
In the report, “Straight Talk,” Frank Luntz presented a set of guidelines for
policy communications to the White House. These recommendations used examples of
environmental communications to contrast Republican and Democratic rhetoric and
stressed the importance of framing and ordering of arguments in addressing any
controversial, public policy issue.  Focusing particularly on issues related to climate
change and environmental protection, Luntz advised the Republican administration on
the language that should be emphasized.  For example, policy communicators need to
emphasize sound science as the guide for policy decisions, that risk must be identified
prior to decision-making and that technology and innovation will lead the preservation
of the environment.
Policy decisions must be presented as common sense solutions.  “The facts are
beside the point.  Facts only become relevant when the public is receptive and willing
to listen to them” (Luntz, Straight Talk).  Other political communication consultants
share the same conviction that language and ordering of arguments will affect how an
audience receives the message.  “It is not enough to present evidence; you have to
change the frame” (Mooney, 2003).
How different types of audiences receive and perceive various messages is core
to the discipline of communication.  Researchers and practitioners alike are interested
in the elements of successful persuasion.  How and what an administration
communicates can affect and be affected by public opinion.  Can policy
communications make or break issues through the use of frames?  Will an
administration ultimately fail because it chose to focus on facts rather on the frame?
And what about the public, do they not want the simple truth?  Is truth not the mere
presentation of “facts”?
1The Concept of Framing
Research on framing has increased dramatically over the last twenty years.
Scheufele (1999) categorized previous framing research along two dimensions: the
type of frame (media frame versus audience frame) and operationalization (as an
independent or dependent variable).  This two-by-two typology demonstrates the broad
range and versatility of framing concepts and clarifies previous attempts to study
framing effects.  But perhaps most revealing through this analysis is that framing
should be viewed through a process model.  In Scheufele’s analysis (1999), the model
includes frame building, frame setting, individual level processes of framing, and
feedback loop from audiences to journalists.  The implication here is that framing takes
on a different definition depending on context, or place in the process of
communication.  Media and audience frames are conceptualized as distinct variables,
where media frames refer to the formulation of content in the message and audience
frames refer to how individuals remember the issues they learn from the media.
The concept of framing should be defined under the social constructivist
paradigm (Scheufele, 1999).  Based on the main assumption that realities or “facts” are
constructed through human interaction, framing becomes one of the central ways
through which communicators may influence perceptions and understanding of a given
situation.  Under these views, the path of framing influence extends from the
communicator’s presentation of a set of information related to an issue to subsequent
problem formulation in the receiver’s mind.  Framing theory then, hypothesizes that
realities or facts can be reconstructed through presentation.
Framing has been described in various ways.  Both Iyengar and Popkin
conceptualized framing as shifting the point of view of the observer so as to alter the
explanation and formulation of a problem.  This way of viewing framing effects is
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based on the assumption is that problem definition leads to solution definition.  This
cognitive mechanism is supported by evidence from earlier psychological experiments
on judgment and choice.
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) classic decision-making study, respondents
were exposed the following problem and one of two versions of proposed solution
sets:
The Asian Disease
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
Version 1
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  If Program B is adopted,
there a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds
probability that nobody will be saved.  Which one of the programs would you
favor?
Version 2
If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.  If Program B is adopted, there a
one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600
people will die.  Which one of the programs would you favor?
Even though the consequences between the two programs remained identical,
the majority of respondents exposed to Version 1 chose Program A whereas in
Version 2, the majority of respondents favored Program B (Tversky & Kahneman,
1982).  The authors theorized that these results illustrated framing effects because4
simple changes in language were enough to draw different choices.  The single
manipulation was changing the words from “will be saved” to “will die”.  Framing
effects, then, can be narrowly defined as “discrepancies between choice problems that
decision makers, upon reflection, consider effectively identical” (Kahneman, 2003).
More broadly, framing has been defined as the “central, organizing idea or
theme of a message” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 3).  Framing and reasoning
devices were identified as tools by which the media portrays events to the public.
They argued that media frames must maintain “narrative fidelity” to be effective in
giving meaning to an issue.  This meant that the media should utilize issue frames that
resonate with other culturally or socially accepted narratives (5).  However, the study
did not focus on how narratives connect with audiences or the cognitive mechanisms
that underlie interpretation and the construction of meaning from media discourse.
Content analysis supported Gamson and Modigliani’s assertions that media
frames contain subtle devices that can give meaning to an issue (Entman, 1991).  U.S.
news coverage of the KAL and Iran plane crashes were coded for keywords,
metaphors, symbols, and size.  Entman theorized that words themselves act as frames
which serve to place events into categories that may imply a moral or normative value.
Like Gamson and Modigliani, Entman (1991) concluded that framing should include
components that “cohere with an established discursive domain…that form a way of
reasoning about a matter that is familiar to audiences from other cultural experiences”
(11).
Entman’s research suggests that language contained in frames can tap
associations of ideas that combine to form ways of reasoning about events that occur in
the world.  More concretely, Entman (1993) described framing as, “select[ing] some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in5
such ways as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (52).
Iyengar (1987) hypothesized that causal beliefs are important to predicting
public opinion and found some evidence to support this claim.  Causal beliefs were
conceptualized as the spontaneous identification of causes contributing to complex
national issues and explanations for their outcomes.  News frames influence causal
beliefs by orienting viewers to understand and explain national events in a particular
way.  However, while the study described how the media can influence beliefs about
causal relations for given issues, cognitive mechanisms were not specified.
Examining attributions further, Iyengar (1989) explored the relationship
between attributions of responsibility, opinions, and attitudes. He operationalized two
dimensions of issue responsibility and theorized that causal attributions focus on the
origins of the issue and treatment attributions focus on the alleviation of issue or
problem solution.  Based on the assumption that individuals are indeed cognitive
misers, reduction of political issues into questions of responsibility was theorized to be
an efficient way by which citizens think about national issues.  Treatment
responsibility then, leads individuals to attribute responsibility to specific groups or
individuals.
Using fictitious stories that only varied in the opening and closing paragraphs,
researchers used an open thought-listing procedure to assess framing effects and found
that participants thought about ideas, feelings, and implications that were well beyond
the information in the stimulus (Price, Tewksbury, and Powers, 1997).  These results
were consistent across four separate conditions.  Although the direction of the thoughts
was attributable to the message frame, the range and variety of thoughts suggested that
audiences have various schemata that contributed to multiple ways of reasoning and6
this led to distinct point of views.  The authors considered possible cognitive
mechanisms and concluded, “By deflecting consideration of other ideas and feelings,
frame-induced knowledge activation can significantly influence decision making by
altering the mix of considerations brought to mind.  Together, the two results illustrate
a kind of hydraulic pattern, with thoughts of one kind, stimulated by the frame, driving
out other possible responses ” (3).
In sum, framing research has focused on a variety of factors, ranging from
framing devices to audience reasoning and evaluation.  Issue frames are a tangible part
of the persuasion process.  It is one component of the message that can be controlled
and manipulated by the communicator.  Extant research suggests that frames can be
subtle and audience responses may be measured in different ways.  This research has
generally measured public opinion in response to a framed stimulus.
However, implied in the description of the “receptive audience” is that there
exists a non-tangible, less predictable component on the receiving end of persuasive
communications.  Theorists have invoked Aristotle’s quote, “It adds to an orator’s
influence if ‘his hearers should be in just the right frame of mind’” (Popkin, 1991, p.
81).  Although little research has examined the exact cognitive mechanisms that
contribute to opinion formation after frame exposure, there is evidence to suggest that
audience schemata are important elements in these cognitive processes.The Concept of Schemata
Like framing, the concept of schema relies on social constructivist assumptions.
In Gestalt psychology, schemata have referred to configurations of prior knowledge
regarding people and situations.  More generally, psychologists have defined schemata
as “organized knowledge structures that embodies important relationships among other
concepts in memory” (Schank & Abelson, 1995, p. 5).  Other psychologists have
defined schemata as “cognitive structure[s] that represents one’s general knowledge
about a given concept or stimulus domain” and that includes “both attributes of a
concept and the relationships among the attributes” (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 13).
Schemata and schemas are used interchangeably in the literature.  Schemas
emphasize the active construction of reality because they can act as “perceptual filters”
(Price, 1992, p. 53).  This is one route by which schemas influence public opinion.
Without schemas, individuals should perceive identical traits from the physical
environment and simultaneously view a constant reality because there is nothing to
alter singular perceptions of reality.  In other words, schemas play a preconscious and
automatic role in cognitive processes.  The construction of reality is the result of the
interplay between individual, schematic contributions, and physical stimuli from the
outside world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 99).
Once activated, one way that schemas can influence the formation of public
opinion is by bringing forward sets of interrelated ideas and information (53).  The
structure, scope, and depth of existing schema can then alter the impact and association
of new, incoming information.  Wick and Drew (1991) found evidence that when
individuals received information consistent with pre-existing knowledge, they are more
likely to make inferences and also recall more facts from the stimulus, demonstrating
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that schemata play an important role in audience extrapolation of information they
receive from the media.
From the sociological perspective, Goffman (1974) defined schemata as
“frameworks” of interpretations people use to recognize and respond to events.  He
wrote, “Each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label
a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (21).  From
this perspective, schemata are assumed to be applied automatically and unconsciously,
affecting how individuals relate to or describe an event.
Distinguishing between natural and social frameworks, different types of schemata are
linked to individual’s constructions of causality (Goffman, 1974).  Natural frameworks
identify “unguided events” whose course and sources are non-human.  In other words,
result of nature and not human action.  Social frameworks, on the other hand, involve
some form of agency.  These schemata account for “guided doings”, which results
from intentional human action.
Shared in psychological and sociological conceptualizations of schemata are
three characteristics.  Schemata are conceptualized as an associative network of
explanations and expectations about the world.   Furthermore, schemata play an
unconscious and automatic role in cognitive processes and affect how people receive
information.  Finally, different schemata may be used to make attributions related to
different types of events.
Media effects researchers have proposed two routes by which public opinion is
influenced in a world filled with media messages (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).  The
first route describes the media’s influence on public perceptions of important issues or
events and the second route elaborates how the media can focus the public’s attention
on particular aspects, or attributes, of events and issues.  In other words, the extent and9
range of media focus can alter the available information and ideas audiences think
about when forming an opinion.
Research over the last several decades has demonstrated that these routes are
not unidirectional, that media effects occur within interrelated processes.  Media
influence is mediated by audience preferences and previous exposure, either through
direct experience or the media.  Price and Tewksbury (1997) suggest that individual
issue frames are constructed through and within these processes, including recurring
media exposure, personal experience, and interaction with others.
Similarly, schema theorists hypothesize that schemata are developed through
two possible routes, personal experience and story-sharing.  Personal experience is the
direct route to schema development whereas story-sharing is the indirect, or secondary,
route (Wyer & Carlston, 1994).  Most publics must experience political processes or
national issues indirectly, through the intermediary of various media (Noelle-
Neumann, 1999).  Issue frames may be one part of audience schemata toward a given
issue.  Media discourse serve as “sets of interpretative packets that give meaning to an
issue” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 3).  Taken together, unless an individual has
direct experience with an issue, two major sources of schema development include the
media and the traditional story-sharing source, an individual’s interpersonal network.
Political theorists have argued that the schema concept is vague and has not
been adequately distinguished from other concepts such as scripts, attitudes, cognitive
maps, and frames (for a review, see Kuklinski, Luskin, & Bolland, 1991).  Others have
suggested that narratives, scenarios, and scripts face the same conceptual challenge
(Popkin, 1991, p. 75).  Although that debate is an ongoing and will not be addressed in
this study, theorists agree that, under the assumptions of schema theory, people make
sense of the world through schemata and tend to view and remember things in10
conformity with their schemata.  For the purposes of this study, it is useful enough to
distinguish scripts as event schema, a type of schema that contains explicit
expectations of behavior in a particular event.  Together, the schemata and scripts
demonstrate that (1) expectations exist for any given situation based on prior exposure,
whether that exposure is through personal experience or is mediated through media,
and (2) other types of schemata exist, possibly ones that have direct political
implications.Framing and Schemata
Frames have the potential to influence only when there are multiple points of
views, of which none are dominant (Popkin, 1991).  The first step in framing an issue
is setting the reference point from which to look at a problem.  Then, frames must cue
schemata based of degrees of representativeness and availability.  Representativeness
refers to a “goodness of fit assessment”, or how the new information fits and coheres
with old information or an accepted narrative.  Availability depends on the recency and
frequency to which the media presents an issue.  Finally, the audience must be active in
connecting the information in the frame with information in their schemata.  Framing
becomes effective in creating meaning when there is resonance between story frames
(from the media) and individual scripts (attained through personal experience and
interaction).
The recurring theme in the research cited thus far is that there is a relationship
between media frames and audience schemata in determining framing effects.
Whereas the media can set the reference point, or point of view through the use of
framing devices, these devices must connect with audience schemata.  Without a
connection to these knowledge structures, individuals would have a difficult time
making sense of incoming media information.
11The Applicability Model of Framing Effects
The role of schemata in framing effects was most specifically addressed in
Price & Tewsbury (1997).  Framing was defined as an applicability effect and its
influence was conceptualized as a short-term cognitive process.  In this model, media
frame must contain some information that is related to an individual’s knowledge store
in his or her schema.  “The greater is the overlap between the features of some stored
knowledge and the attended features of a stimulus, the greater is the applicability of the
knowledge to the stimulus and the greater is the likelihood that the knowledge will be
activated in the presence of the stimulus” (Price & Tewksbury cited Higgins, 1996,
p. 135). Applicability, then, refers to the level of consonance between features in
individual schemata and features that are highlighted in the media frame.
Researchers have argued that framing is related to “the media’s ability to alter
the applicability of knowledge” and emphasized that “the exact psychological means
by which [framing] operates” is vague and is not supported by empirical evidence
(Price & Tewksbury, 1997, p. 176).  They argue that the concept of schemata can be
used to account for how people process information.  In the applicability model,
framing is a process by which the media activates some ideas while leaving out others.
Price and Tewksbury (1997) theorized, “Determination of fit between the
stored constructs and the environment occurs at the intersection of existing knowledge
and attributes of the stimulus situation noted by the perceiver” (190).  In other words,
there is an automatic and unconscious “matching judgment” that is made between the
features of the message and relevant constructs in the receiver’s schemata.  This
“matching” process partially explains why particular explanations and expectations are
activated over other information in an individual’s knowledge store.
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Communicators can manipulate the salience of particular message attributes to
provoke an audience to attend to the message.  For example, novelty is one way to
attract attention and increase the salience of an argument.  Once applicable knowledge
is activated, individuals are hypothesized to be within a “train of thought” which then
determines the range of conclusions they can reach.
There are two assumptions in Price and Tewksbury’s model.  First, the model
assumes that people have schemata or associative networks through which information
is interpreted and processed.  Various constructs are linked together in this associative
network of explanations and expectations about the world, but these schematic links do
not form a predetermined hierarchy.  In fact, the links may be “tangled” because
constructs can hold different and multiple positions in different sub-networks within
the larger schema network.  Second, only small parts of schematic networks can be
activated and matched at any given time.  The implication is that certain links in the
schema can be emphasized over other relationships in a given situation but these links
can change in light of new information or stimulus, highlighting other parts of the
schemata.  The lack of hierarchy within the schematic structure accounts for
unpredictability in audience responses.
In short, the applicability model is a two phase approach to framing effects.
First, communication frames must resonate with underlying audience schemata in
order for pre-existing knowledge to be activated.  Once an active train of thought is
engaged, framing effects occur when the attended features of the message corresponds
with the active constructs and relevant links in individual schemata.
This expectation stems from previous research on schemata.  Psychologists
have found that people classify and recall schema consistent information more easily.
However, the relationship between schematic memory and schematic strength must14
take into account knowledge and expertise in the given area.  In other words,
knowledge and expertise contributes to the development of individual schemata.
Before information can be remembered, an individual must have available schemata
from which connections are made.  Thus, individuals with underdeveloped schemata in
a particular topic area may be more susceptible to inconsistent information because
baseline information is unavailable (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
This general hypothesis in schema theory has found support in studies relating
political issues.  Political knowledge predicts expertise and expertise predicts
information recall that reflects a schema-consistent bias (Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990;
Lodge & Hamill, 1986).  Furthermore, individuals with more developed political
schemata are more organized and extreme in their evaluations of the President,
political issues, and political candidates (Lusk & Judd, 1988; McGraw & Pinney,
1990).
Price & Tewksbury does not explicitly include a mechanism for true opinion
change as an outcome of framing effects.  However, frequent and cumulative exposure
to non-applicable information regarding personally relevant issues combined with
conditions of uncertainty may motivate individuals to develop new or expand old
schemata.  They write, “When particular constructs become subject to routine
activation and use over time, via applicability and accessibility, then there is certainly
the potential for long-term and perhaps cumulative effects” (199).  The extent to which
chronic accessibility can influence schema development and change opinion is unclear
and not addressed in the current literature.  Future studies might address schema and
opinion change over time but the current study is cross sectional in nature and will not
evaluate this issue.The Current Study
Previous framing research has been summarized along two dimensions: the
type of frame, media frames versus audience frames, and operationalization, frames as
the independent versus dependent variable (Scheufele, 1999).  Under this typology, the
current study is focused on the individual-level processes of framing.  The study is
concerned with how audiences make attributions and evaluations upon exposure to a
framed message.  Thus, there are two main independent variables in the study, the
framed message and relevant schemata.  The dependent variables are causal
explanations, attributions of responsibility, and policy opinion.
Theoretical Expectations
The literature suggests several hypotheses.  Based on the applicability model,
relevant schemata play the determining role in framing effects.  The first set of
hypotheses center on factors contributing to schematic development, which is
operationalized as schema strength.
H1a: Attention to science and technology news content on television is
positively correlated with schema strength.
H1b: Attention to science and technology content in newspapers is positively
correlated with schema strength.
H1c: Seeking science and technology news content on the Internet is
positively correlated with schema strength.
The second set of hypotheses rely on schemata measures as the independent
variable.  Based on schema theory, differences in schematic strength influence recall
and judgment of incoming information.
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H2:   Individuals with well developed schemata will recognize schema
consistent and inconsistent information better than individuals with
underdeveloped schemata.  This will affect subsequent evaluations.
Previous findings suggest that framed messages can orient audiences to
particular causal attributions that are linked to attributions of responsibility.
Subsequent policy opinions are formed on the basis of these attributions.  According to
schema theory and the applicability model, causal and responsibility attributions reflect
an individual’s schemata in relation to the information contained in frames.
H3a: Respondents with high schema strength will have schema consistent
attributions.
H3b: Respondents with low schema strength will have frame consistent
attributions.
H4a: Respondents with high schema strength will have schema consistent
policy opinions.
H4b: Respondents with low schema strength will have frame consistent
policy opinions.
The applicability model predicts that a “matching judgment” between salient
attributes of relevant schemata and of the frame must occur before there can be
framing effects.  Therefore, for individuals with well developed schemata, effects will
be magnified when the frame resonates with the relevant schema.  In other words,
respondents will identify strongly with frame and this will lead to more extreme
attributions and policy opinions.
H5a: When exposed to a resonating stimulus frame, respondents with
corresponding medium or high schema strength will have more extreme
causal attributions.17
H5b: When exposed to a resonating stimulus frame, respondents with
corresponding medium or high schema strength will have more extreme
attributions of responsibility.
H5c: When exposed to a resonating stimulus frame, respondents with
corresponding medium or high schema strength will have more extreme
policy opinions.
Lastly, the order of schema measures may contribute to the effect of the frame.
Rotating the order of the frame stimulus and the order by which schema measures are
probed is a secondary manipulation in this study.  Public opinion survey questions
often require respondents to specify and quantify an attitude.  Researchers have pointed
to evidence that survey respondents often answer questions based on ideas and feelings
that are “top-of-mind” (Zaller & Feldman, 1992).
Consistent with the applicability model, this view assumes individuals have a
multitude of ideas and considerations in their mind.  The top-of-mind view
hypothesizes that audiences will use a sample of ideas to answer questions and that this
sample of ideas may be based on a number of factors such as the survey itself, the
context of the question, and other recent events that may have triggered those ideas.
“Their choices do not, in most cases, reflect anything that can be described as true
attitudes; rather, they reflect the thoughts that are most accessible in memory at the
moment of response” (Zaller & Feldman, 1992, p. 580).
The design of the study is intended to find changes in attributions of cause and
responsibility and policy opinions that can be attributed to the frame stimulus.
However, given that previous theorizing has found that effects may sometimes be a
methodological artifact rather that real communication effects (Moy, Scheufele,18
Eveland, & McCleod, 2001), the order in which schemas are measured will be
randomly rotated with the frame stimulus in order to provide two separate conditions,
one where respondents are asked the schema measures prior to frame exposure and the
other where respondents are asked the schema measures after the frame exposure.
Under the assumptions of the applicability model, it is expected that individual
schemata should remain independent of the frame stimulus.  However, in a survey
design, the mere posing of the question may direct the respondents’ responses in subtle
ways and serve as a prime for other schemata.  Thus, the following research question is
of interest:
RQ:  In an experimental survey design, what are the potential effects of
measuring schemas in varying order?Method and Design
Research on media frames and schemata has generally relied on experimental
methods.  Experiments allow for elaborate manipulations of framing such as inclusion of
visual aids, highlighted print formats, and increased text.  Open thought listing protocols
in experiments provide additional qualitative and quantitative measures that are better at
assessing the scope and content of audience schemata.  The survey technique would have
difficulty emulating these qualities.  However, while experiments can better address  the
challenges of measuring schemas, smaller sample sizes and reliance on college student
samples can result in lower external validity and generalizability.
Using a computer-assisted telephone survey offers the benefit of large, national
samples.  However, there are limitations of time and space on stimulus construction and
schema measures in the questionnaire.  Closed-ended questions also restrict responses to
a predefined set of possible schemata representations.  However, if results demonstrate
similar effects to those seen in experimental studies, the results would provide additional
support for previous theorizing.
Sampling
 The sampling was drawn from a national representative household list and
respondents were selected by requesting either the male or female in the household with
the most recent birthday (N=781).  The interviewing period began on October 26 and
ended on November 17, 2003.  Interviews were conducted by students from a survey
research methods class and calls were made during evenings and weekends.  The
response rate for this study was 55%, which counts both complete and partial interviews
as respondents in relation to the total number of households sampled, including non-
contacts and refusals.
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The Issue: Biotechnology and Genetically Modified Foods
According to a recent Gallup poll and a survey sponsored by the Pew Initiative,
public awareness of issues related to biotechnology and genetically modified foods are
generally low in the U.S.  Awareness is low even though genetically modified food
products have been in the market for almost ten years.  This topic is appropriate as it
will present an issue where the public will have wide ranging awareness and schema
development.
Furthermore, under the definition of framing effects as “formulation effects”, in
order for framing effects to occur, there must not be a dominant point of view (Popkin,
1991).  The labeling of genetically modified foods is a controversial issue over which
the public is divided.  Proponents of labeling argue that consumers have the right to
information and to choose what foods to consume.  They also argue that consumers
must be protected from the potential risks of genetically modified foods (GMFs).
Opponents of labeling have argued that it is in the interest of the state to promote
innovation in food production and there must be beneficial production arrangements
with the food industry in order for market GMFs.  Overregulation may increase pricing
and decrease demand for innovation food products.  These countering views provide
areas where schema development may be tested.
Frame Construction
In      Straight Talk       , Frank Luntz specified nine principles for Republican policy
communications on the environment and global warming.  While the principles were
for speech and press release communications, space and time restrictions in the current
study required the creation of a brief message.  Furthermore, previous research
provides evidence that mere changes in language were enough to elicit framing effects.21
Thus, a few of Luntz’s principles were chosen based on relevancy and applicability to
biotechnology and were translated into frames that were a few sentences long.  These
principles are listed in the Appendix.
Two frames were constructed, “Non-Regulation” and “Regulation”.  The Non-
regulation frame (n=380 or 49%) emphasized scientific research before regulations are
implemented whereas the Regulation frame (n=401 or 51%) emphasized immediate
regulation and protection.  Survey interviewers emphasized the underlined words when
reading the stimulus to each respondent.
Non-Regulation Frame
With genetically modified foods, we must not rush to judgment without     all the
facts     .  And as a country, we need to invest in more research and development to
protect the future of our citizens.  New regulations should       only        be made based
on       good scientific information       .
Regulation Frame
With genetically modified foods, we must identify all risks and health issues.
The FDA        must protect       our citizens by requiring research that ensures these
products are safe for humans and the environment.         New regulations now         will
protect our citizens from any future harm.
Schema Measures
Six ten-point scale items assessed the extent to which respondents agreed that
scientific information versus federal regulation should lead the treatment of
biotechnology issues.  Items were grouped into “Information” versus “Regulation”
schemata and are listed in the appendix.  Reliability coefficients for the Information
and Regulation schema measures were .44 and .63, respectively.22
Two schema strength indicators reflected sum values of extremity scores for
Information and Regulation.  Extremity scores were calculated by folding over the
original scale items into a five-point scale (“1”= zero schema strength to “5”=very high
schema strength).  For example, a one or ten on the original agreement scale items
would indicate an extremity score of five.  A total high extremity score of fifteen was
possible for each schema strength indicator.  Relative to sample distribution,
respondents were then grouped into low, medium, and high schema strength groups
based on their total extremity scores.
Two other schema indicators were created to account for the direction of the
schema.  These indicators of schema direction, “Information” and “Regulation”, were
additive indices of three ten-point scale items each; each schema direction indicator
could have a possible high score of thirty, indicating complete agreement with the
Information or Regulation statement.  Respondents were again grouped into low,
medium, and high groups based on relative distribution.  Each group contained
approximately 33% of respondents.
Antecedent Measures
Three separate measures assessed attention to science and technology news in the
media, including newspaper, television, and the World Wide Web.  Two additional
measures assessed awareness of and support for biotechnology issues.  All measures
used ten-point scales.  Exact wording, means, and standard deviations for these measures
are reported in Table 1.
Demographic measures included gender (55 percent females), age (M=50.08,
SD=17.16), and education or years of formal schooling (M=14.63, SD=2.95).  A measure
of ideology (M=8.34, SD=2.76) was also included; ideology was operationalized by
combining two seven-point scales of economic and social ideology (“1” = very liberal to23
Table 1 Means and standard deviations for three measures:
attention to science and technology news across three media, awareness, and support
of biotechnology
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“7” = very conservative) into an additive index (r=.547, a=.000).  Other items in the
survey were unrelated to the current study.
Procedure
All respondents were questioned on their level of attention to science and
technology news in the media, awareness of, and support for biotechnology prior to the
main manipulation.  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a
two by two (frame x schema measure order) design.  Half of the sample was exposed to
schema measures before the stimulus (“Schema First”) and the other half was exposed to
the stimulus before the schema measures (“Frame First”).  The purpose of the random
ordering of the schema measures and the stimulus was to detect any differences due to
priming and control for accessibility effects.  Respondents were also randomly split into
either the Non-regulation or the Regulation frame.  Table 2 illustrates the double split
ballot design.
Table 2 Two by two experimental design
Regulation Frame
Schema First
Regulation Frame
Schema Second
Non-Regulation Frame
Schema First
Non-Regulation Frame
Schema Second
Type of
Frame
Order of Exposure to Schema Measures *
* Schema measures are identical across all four conditions25
Immediately after exposure to the stimulus, all respondents were asked a
single-item manipulation check.  The two frames, according to Tversky and
Kahneman’s narrow definition, should have identical content and differ only in the
point of view or reference point in the presentation.  Since the messages should have
non-differentiated content, individuals should not be able to differentiate between or
consistently identify one group as the source of the message.  However, based on H2,
differences are expected for respondents with highly developed schemata because they
are more likely to recognize schema-consistent and inconsistent information.
After the manipulation check, all respondents were exposed to three sets of
dependent measures, including causal attributions, attributions of responsibility, and
policy opinion.  Respondents were not exposed to the causal attribution questions if
they did not feel biotechnology was risky.  Demographic information was requested at
the end of the survey.
Dependent Measures
Four ten-point measures on causal attributions were used to create two
indicators, “Treatment” and “Global” causal attributions.  Treatment attributions
represented attribution of risk to micro-factors such as individuals or government
policies whereas Global attributions represented attribution of risk to macro-factors
such as science and the nature of information.  Each indicator was calculated as the
average of two items; respondents who chose not to answer any one of the items were
excluded.  Correlations between items in the Treatment and Global causal attribution
indicators were both significant, r=.472, a=.000 and r=.355, a=.000, respectively.
Four ten-point scale measures assessed attributions of responsibility to four
different groups.  These items were kept as separate measures since federal agencies,26
independent organizations, private corporations and industry trade groups, and
consumers represent distinct entities.
Four ten-point scale measures on policy opinion were grouped into two
indicators, “Non-regulatory” and “Regulatory”, to represent support for a particular
policy principle.  Support for “Non-regulatory” policy indicated agreement with
scientific information as a priority whereas support for “Regulatory” indicated
agreement with control and labeling regulations.
Each indicator was the average of two items.  Items correlated at r= .266,
a=.000, and r=.427, a=.000, for the Non-regulatory and Regulatory policy indicators,
respectively.  Table 3 contains the means and standard deviations for all dependent
measures.27
Table 3 Means and standard deviations for outcome variables
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0Analyses and Results
Factors Contributing To Schema Strength and Direction
The four indicators, Information schema strength (M=8.33, SD=3.79) and
direction (M=20.90, SD=5.11), and Regulation schema strength (M=8.39, SD=3.97)
and direction (M=20.80, SD=5.80), were correlated against all antecedent measures
and demographic variables in bivariate analysis.  An alpha level of .05 was used for all
statistical tests.
Age, gender, education, and ideology were uncorrelated with neither
Information schema strength nor schema direction.  Interestingly, these measures were
correlated with Regulation schema strength.  Age was slightly correlated with
Regulation schema strength (r=.076, a=.039).  Gender (r=-.107, a=.004), education
(r=.095, a=.012), and ideology (r=-.127, a=.000) were correlated only with Regulation
schema direction.  These correlations suggest that older, female, more educated, and
liberal respondents have stronger regulatory constructs in their schemata.
Information schema strength and direction was positively related to all types of
media attention, providing support for the three hypotheses in H1.  This set of
hypotheses proposed that attention to media (across types) is positively related to
schema development but did not differentiate between the content of the schema,
regulation versus information.  Attention to science and technology news stories in
newspapers was positively related to Information schematic strength at r=.108, a=.006.
Seeking science and technology news online was positively correlated with
Information schematic strength at r=.110, a=.012.  Information schema direction was
also positively correlated with newspaper attention (r=.145, a=.000), television
attention (r=.167, a=.000), and information seeking online (r=.170, a=.000).  In
2829
particular, attention to science and technology news on television was positively
related to       both        Information and Regulation schematic strength at r=.119, a=.001 and
r=.091, a=.012, respectively.  These findings are consistent with previous literature on
portrayal of science in the media.
Awareness of biotechnology was positively correlated with Information schema
strength (r=.140, a=.000) and direction (r=.166, a=.000) but not correlated with the
two Regulation schema indicators.  Support of biotechnology was uncorrelated with
neither Information nor Regulation schema strength.  However, support of
biotechnology was positively correlated with Information schema direction (r=.255,
a=.000) and negatively correlated with Regulation schema direction (r=-.083, a=.030).
Table 4 outlines these findings.
Manipulation Check
To assess the difference between the two framed statements, all respondents
were asked if they thought the statement (stimulus frame) came from an interest group
for or against regulations of genetically modified foods (GMFs).  Excluding
respondents who refused to answer or answered “Don’t Know”, 75% of respondents
believed the statement came from an interest group for regulation of GMFs.  However,
there was a significant difference between framed conditions (t(690)=-4.74, a=.00),
indicating that respondents exposed to the Regulation frame were more likely to
perceive the statement as coming from an interest group for regulation.  There was no
difference between respondents who were exposed to the “Schema First and the
“Schema Second” conditions.
Further analysis revealed that respondents with high Regulation schema
strength were more likely to correctly identify the Non-regulation frame than30
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respondents with medium Regulation schema strength (t(211)=-2.05, p=.04) and low
Regulation schema strength (t(205)=-3.02, p=.00).  Thus, Regulation schematic
strength is directly related to having a different perception of frame source (interest
group for or against regulation) between the two conditions.  These findings
demonstrate two things: (1) respondents across both conditions generally assumed a
pro-regulation interest group as the source for the framed statements, and (2) support
for H2, which proposed that individuals with developed schemata are more likely to
recognize schema consistent information, i.e., respondents with high Regulation
schema strength were more like to notice the argument in the Regulation frame.
It is important to note, however, that parallel results were not found for the high
Information strength group; these respondents were not more likely to correctly
identify the Regulation frame.  This difference may be attributable to the way that
information and regulation schemata are linked in the respondents’ minds.  For
example, a regulation perspective on biotechnology may be automatically associated
with ideas about scientific information and research.  In other words, to regulate
genetically modified foods is to require more information through labeling and
research.
Differences between Conditions
An independent-samples t-test found no differences between the four
conditions, demonstrating the lack of a main effect.  However, by controlling for
schema strength, multiple t-tests were conducted and found differences that would
indicate an interaction effect between different schemata combinations and the
stimulus.  The following findings provide limited support for the applicability model of
framing effects.2932
Interactions between schema strength and frame stimulus.  To test the
hypotheses on the role of schemata in influencing framing effects, t-tests were
conducted to look for differences between the two framed conditions while holding
schematic group constant.  Exposure to the Regulation versus Non-regulation frames
resulted in differences in causal attributions for respondents across different schematic
groups.
Two different schematic groups (respondents with low Regulation and medium
Information schemata and respondents with low Regulation and high Information
schemata) were more likely to attribute risks associated with biotechnology to global
causes such as the nature of science and information if they were exposed to the Non-
Regulation frame, which emphasized that “new regulations should only be made based
on good scientific information” ((t(51)=2.20, p=.03 and t(9)=5.75, p=.00, respectively).
These differences in Global attributions were not found across the seven other
schematic groups.  Figure 1 illustrates the differences across conditions and Table 5 in
the Appendix contains mean scores across all schematic groups.
Similarly, significant differences were found in the Treatment attributions of
two schematic groups across framed conditions.  Treatment attributions represent the
reverse of Global attributions. Treatment attributions attribute the cause of risk to
government policies and individuals.  As expected, when exposed to the Regulation
frame, which argued that the FDA must require research and create regulations to
protect citizens from unsafe products, respondents with stronger schemata (medium
Regulation and high Information schematic strength) were more likely to agree with
treatment as the cause of risk (t(35)=-2.36, p=.02).  However, in direct contrast,
respondents with low Regulation and medium Information schemas were less likely to
agree with Treatment attributions (t(51)=2.73, p=.01).  Figure 2 illustrates the33
Figure 1 Effect of frame on Global attributions for
respondents from two schematic groups
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Figure 2 Effect of frame on Treatment attributions for
respondents from two schematic groups
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differences across conditions and Table 6 in the Appendix contains mean agreement
with Treatment attributions across all schematic groups.
Next, differences in attributions of responsibility to specific groups were only
significant in one particular schema group and only when the responsible group in
question was the government.  Respondents with high Regulation and low Information
schema strength who were exposed to the Non-regulation frame were more likely to
attribute responsibility to the government (t(14)=2.67, p=.02).  Figure 3 illustrates this
finding and Table 7 in the Appendix details results across other schematic groups.
Parallel differences were not found for the other three dependent measures
which asked respondents whether groups such as private corporations, non-
governmental organizations, and individuals are responsible for ensuring the safety of
genetically modified foods.  Table 8 through 10 in the Appendix details these non-
significant findings.  These findings provide partial support for the two hypotheses
(H3a and H3b), which stated that respondents with high schema strength were
expected to be immune to the frame stimulus whereas respondents with low schema
strength are more susceptible to framing effects.  However, there is only partial support
because differences were found only in a particular schematic strength group and not in
others.
Together, H4a and H4b stated the expected differences in policy opinion
between schema groups upon exposure to the framed stimulus.  No interactions
between schema strength and stimulus frame were found to elicit differences in policy
agreement.  This set of hypotheses was not supported as respondents across all
schematic groups were not affected by the frame in their policy opinions.  Tables 11
and 12 in the Appendix details these findings.36
Figure 3 Effect of frame on attributions of responsibility to government for
respondents with high Regulation and low Information schema strength
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Interactions between schema strength, direction of schema, and frame.  T-tests
between conditions were conducted while controlling for schema strength and
direction to test the fifth set of hypotheses.  H5a, H5b, and H5c most directly addressed
the predictions of the applicability model.  These hypotheses stated that increased
resonance between the frame and the underlying schema would result in more extreme
causal and responsibility attributions as well as policy opinion.  However, no
significant interactions were found.
Interaction between frame, schema order, and schema strength.  Multiple
three-way interaction effects were found between schema order and framed conditions
for particular schematic strength groups.  Tables 13 to 28 in the Appendix details these
mixed findings.  In line with theoretical expectations, schema order had a magnifying
effect for particular schematic groups across various measures of responsibility
attribution and policy opinions.  However, some results were unexpected and can not
be attributed to the frame or the schema order.
Agreement with policy principles differed for two groups that were exposed the
schema measures after the frame.  First, respondents with low Regulation and low
Information schema strength who were exposed to the Regulation frame and the
schema measures afterwards were less likely to agree with Information policy
principles (t(55)=-2.16, p=.04).  Secondly, respondents with low Regulation and
medium Information schema strength who were exposed to the Non-regulation frame
and the schema measures afterwards were less likely to agree with the Regulatory
policy principles (t(33)=-2.30, p=.03).  Together, these results suggest that the order of
schema measures makes a marked difference on policy opinion by further directing the
association of ideas in the respondent’s mind after exposure to the frame.  Figure 4 and38
5 illustrates these interactions.  Tables 19 and 28 in the Appendix contain the results
for other schematic groups in these conditions.
Other results demonstrate the effect of the frame combined with the effect of
schema measures which followed.  Respondents with medium Regulation schema
strength (with varying strengths of Information schema) who were exposed to the Non-
regulation frame and the schema measures second were more likely to attribute
responsibility to non-governmental organizations, private corporations and industry
trade groups, and consumers (see Appendix - Tables 16, 17, and 18, respectively).
Notably, in complete reversal, respondents with high regulatory schemata and
medium information schemata were less likely to attribute responsibility to non-
governmental agencies and private corporations (see Tables 16 and 18 in the
Appendix).  This finding was somewhat paralleled in conditions where respondents
with medium Regulation and high Information schemata were exposed to the
Regulation frame and schema measures second (see Table 24).  Here, respondents
attributed more responsibility to non-governmental agencies for ensuring the safety of
genetically modified foods.
A three way interaction between the Non-Regulation frame, schema order, and
schema strength was found for Treatment attributions (see Table 13).  In line with
theoretical expectations, respondents with medium Regulation and medium
Information schemata were less likely to agree with treatment as the cause of risk in
biotechnology after exposure to the Non-Regulation frame.  However, a second
finding, in Global attributions, was not consistent with theoretical expectations.
Respondents reported less agreement with global attributions, where higher agreement
with global attributions were expected for respondents who were exposed to the Non-
regulation frame and the schema measures second, particularly within schematic39
Figure 4 Effect of schema order on agreement with Non-regulatory policy for
respondents with low Regulation and low Information schema strength
who were exposed to the Regulation frame
t(133) = -2.30, p=.03
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Figure 5 Effect of schema order on agreement with Regulatory policy for
respondents with low Regulation and medium Information schema strength
who were exposed to the Non-regulation frame
(t(55)=-2.16, p=.04)
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groups of stronger Information schemas.  Table 13 in the Appendix details this
unexpected finding.Conclusions
The first set of results suggest that demographics are related to some content in
schemata, however, media attention are likely to be better predictors.  Here,
demographics and media attention served as the independent variables and the schema
strength indicators served as dependent variables.  Information schema strength was
undifferentiated between demographic groups whereas Regulation schema strength
varied between gender, age, educational, and ideological groups.  In particular, older,
female, more educated and liberal respondents expressed stronger agreement with
regulatory schema measures.
Respondents who reported increased attention to science and technology across
all media also displayed higher Information schema strength and direction but not
Regulation strength and direction.  In other words, media attention to science and
technology news is related to the belief that research and information is important to
guiding regulation.  This suggests that through use of the media, the public learns
about and adopts a more positive view of scientific information and progress in
biotechnology.  Survey data, however, can not assess the causal direction in this
relationship.  The alternative explanation is that individuals with more positive
attitudes towards science and information consume media content in line with their
views.
Television was the only medium that was related to Regulation schema
strength, suggesting that television content on science and technology fuels competing
schemata.  This finding is in line for previous research that television may cultivate
particular views of science, for example, that of a “mad scientist” or the potential
consequences of “man over nature”.  Thus, respondents who obtain news from
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television may also be heavy viewers who believe that regulations are necessary to
ensure safety.
Correlations between awareness of and support of biotechnology and schema
indicators further support the conclusion that increased awareness of biotechnology
and a positive attitude toward scientific processes is related to faith in an information
approach to public policy.  Support of biotechnology appears to take into account both
types of schemata, Information and Regulation.  Respondents who agreed more with
scientific information supported biotechnology whereas respondents who agreed more
with regulation of biotechnology were less supportive of biotechnology.
At first glance, the second set of findings, which were results from the
manipulation check, seemed to indicate that the frames were identifiably different in
content.  Here, schema strength indicators became the independent variables and
source recognition was the dependent variable, representing correct recall of
information and evaluation of the statement.  However, further analysis revealed that
the differences in perception were due to differences in schema strength.  In
conformity with H2, the check served to confirm that the two frames were virtually
indistinguishable in content and demonstrated that individuals with stronger schemas
are more likely to recognize schema consistent information.
Unfortunately, the subtle differences between the two frames may have also
contributed to the weak findings for the next two sets of hypotheses.  H3 and H4 were
based on the two independent variables, schema development and the stimulus frame.
Dependent variables for H3 and H4 were attributions and policy opinion, respectively.
As expected, low schema strength respondents who were more likely to be influenced
by the stimulus frames.  However, this finding was robust only with causal attributions44
and responsibility attribution to government but not with attributions of responsibility
to three other groups and policy opinions.
These findings suggest that when individuals possess regulatory schemata that
are weaker in nature, exposure to a regulation argument taps other available schemata.
The current study focused only on regulatory versus information schemata and found
stronger information schemata in respondents, especially those who utilized media for
science and technology news.  In this study, the information schema seemed to
override the regulation argument presented.  However, if the Regulation schema were
more developed, respondents were then more likely to assign the cause of risk to
individuals and government policies.
The findings on causal attributions were not completely in line with theoretical
expectations.  The Regulation frame specified that “the FDA        must       protect American
citizens from dangers of genetically modified foods.”  As expected, respondents
exposed to this message were more likely to disagree with Global attributions, which
attributed the cause of risk to general flaws in science and technology information.
However, respondents in the same group were also more likely to disagree with
Treatment attributions, which attributed the cause of risk to flaws in policy and
decisions in the treatment of the problem.  One explanation for this may be that the
measures were unclear and unreliable.  Language in the Regulation frame may have
triggered causal attributions that were different than those measures included in the
current design.
Another potential explanation for these results can be found in Zaller’s (1992)
Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, which assumes that people will sample from
ideas already salient in their minds to form judgments.  Thus, theory would predict that45
schemas should naturally be consistent with subsequent attributions and policy
opinions.  Another explanation may be that the schema measures themselves were
primes for subsequent evaluations and increased the salience of ideas in people’s
minds.
The findings from the frame, schema order and schema strength interactions
suggest that there is a process of knowledge activation that is similar to the “hydraulic
pattern” Price termed in 1997.  This would imply that upon exposure to the frame,
respondents became more sensitive to the schema statements.  Knowledge activation
via the frame suggests a priming effect (the respondents reported schema responses
based on salient ideas triggered by of the previous frame).  In this sense, the schema
measures can no longer be independent measures of association of ideas and cognitive
structures in the respondents’ minds.  Furthermore, in line with previous theorizing,
respondents report attitudes that are consistent with prior cognitive self-reports (Moy,
et al., 2002, 3).
Finally, there was no support for the three hypotheses included in H5.  To test
one assumption of the applicability model, it was necessary to analyze the direction of
schema development (e.g. agree versus disagree) along with the frame.  Resonance is
present if the direction of the respondent’s attitudes and of the argument expressed by
the frame is consonant.  Here, attributions and policy opinions were, again, the main
dependent variables.  Null findings suggest that the applicability model may not
accurately describe how framing effects occur.  However, the results may be due to
instrument validity.  By utilizing six closed-end measures in survey format, the design
may not have adequately captured audience schemata.  Schemata are non-hierarchical46
and multi-faceted and it is possible that the current survey design failed to probe in
depth, other pertinent schemata related to biotechnology issues.
Related, the manipulations introduced in this study were only a few sentences
long and were designed to be as identical as possible in content.  It is possible that such
small differences were not enough to engage the audience to think and relate different
schemata to the issue at hand.  Future designs should include more elaborate framing
techniques, or are longer in length, to provide a stronger message and points of schema
stimulation for audiences.Discussion
The results from this study provided limited support for the applicability model
of framing effects.  The stimulus frames did not result in any main effects across
conditions, which may be interpreted as support because main effects of the frame
were absent when schemata were unaccounted for.  Another explanation for these
findings may be that the manipulation was not strong enough.  This interpretation
would suggest that framing issues must include longer-term and more developed
messages, such as continued media coverage, televised speeches, and visual aids in
order to achieve effects.
The current findings suggest that in countries where development
communication strategies need to be formed around biotechnology issues, the role of
the audience and their underlying schemata takes on additional importance.  Schematic
structures are multi-faceted with content that vary in both strength and direction.
Messages that may influence one segment of the audience may not influence others.
And when effects are measured in the aggregate, the individual group effects may not
be apparent.
The national survey sample used in this study necessitated the creation of a
brief message whereas previous studies on framing were experiments based on smaller
samples with greater control over the framed message as well as other factors such as
noise and environment.  For example, a telephone interview can not control a
respondent’s focus or attention.  Combined with factors such as other measures in the
survey, respondents may simply have chosen not to process the message.  However,
one can also assume that noise effects were randomly distributed across the conditions.
4748
The current data does strongly support the following: schema development is
directly related to different types of media consumption and schemata are directly
related to an individual’s causal attributions, attributions of responsibility, and policy
opinions towards issues surrounding regulation of biotechnology.  Furthermore,
individual schema measures, causal and responsibility attributions, and policy
opinions, which included a total of 24 measures, were highly inter-correlated,
demonstrating the complexity of schematic structures.  Taken together, the results
demonstrate the need, as Price and Tewksbury (1997) had pointed out, for continued
research into the specific cognitive mechanisms that underlying framing effects.
Furthermore, the interactions between schema strength and frame demonstrate
the importance of the role of schemata.  The three-way interaction findings also
support this conclusion.  In the present study, schematic structures seem to influence
framing effects by either acting as filters or as primes for subsequent thoughts.
Respondents’ schematic structures were significantly related to media use.  This
finding suggests that campaigns for or against genetically modified foods must account
for media use in the audience.
Seemingly irrelevant schemata might also become relevant if frames were able
to tap them.  This study did not focus on examining the milieu of schemata that are
applicable to issues related to biotechnology.  Mixed findings across some of the
schematic groups suggest that unmeasured schemata may be influencing people’s
responses to the dependent measures.
One possible explanation for the mixed findings may be that there were
framing effects but the measures constructed for this survey were not able to capture
other relevant effects.  Future studies might proceed to increase instrument validity and49
control through experimentation in a lab environment, however, generalizability and
external validity may be the trade-off.
Theory suggests that when tapped, other schemata can act as counter-frames, or
filters to a framed message.  For example, a regulation frame may utilize stories of
illnesses that result from unsafe foods.  Alternatively, a non-regulation frame might use
a story of children in poverty that can now be fed due to advances in agriculture.  Both
these frames can tap other schemas using the human interest angle.  These types of
frames may be used in counterarguments.  Additionally, frames may also tap other
schemas to first engage the audience in order to present the main arguments.
To date, no other study has tested the applicability model.  Theory and
experience still support Price and Tewksbury’s conceptualization of the applicability
model.  The applicability model points out individuals are engaged in an “active train
of thought” when the information contained in frames resonate with existing schemata.
The advantage of this model is that it explains how knowledge activation spreads to
affect evaluations.  Future studies utilizing a national survey design should incorporate
ways of focusing the respondent’s attention on the information contained in the frame
and further explore the differences in framing effects in relation to differences in
schematic strength.  Experimental research is also necessary to clarify on how
knowledge activation can contribute to or detract from framing effects.  Research can
also refine schema measures over time.
More research on the cognitive mechanisms underlying framing effects is
important for communication researchers, development communication, and policy
communication specialists.  The applicability model predicted that relevant schemata50
must be available and applied before framing effects can occur.  Understanding these
processes will illuminate how to achieve persuasive communications through framing
techniques and devices.APPENDIX
Principles applied in frame construction (Unpublished Report,      Straight Talk       )
(1) Sound science must be our guide in choosing which problems to tackle and
how to approach them.
(2) We should identify the real risks to human safety before we decide how to
address a problem.
(3) Technology, innovation, and discovery should play a major role in preserving a
clean and healthy environment.
(4) The best solutions to environmental challenges are common sense solutions.
Schema Measures
Three Information schema measures asked respondents to indicate the extent to which
they agreed with the following statements:
(1) Sound science must out guide in choosing which foods are safe.
(2) We need more information on the real risks to human health and safety before
we introduce more regulations.
(3) Scientific tests can decide whether or not a food product is definitely safe.
Three Regulation schema measures asked respondents to indicate the extent to which
they agreed with the following statements:
(1) Federal regulations will play a major role in preserving a clean and healthy
environment.
(2) Federal regulations are absolutely necessary to protect American consumers.
(3) More regulations are necessary before any more genetically modified
organisms are allowed in the food system.
5152
Causal Attribution Measures
Causal attribution measures were posed only to respondents who agreed that there are
risks associated with genetically modified foods.
Global attribution reflected the average of respondent’s agreement with the following
two statements about what causes environmental and health risks associated with
GMOs:
(1) There is not enough scientific research to prove or disprove human risks.
(2) Genetically modified foods are part of a new technology that is still
developing.
Treatment attributions reflected the average of respondent’s agreement with:
(1) Federal regulations are lacking.
(2) Consumers do not have enough information.
Attribution of Responsibility Measures
Respondents were to indicate the extent to which each of the following groups should
be responsible for ensuring the safety of genetically modified foods and agricultural
products.
(“1” = least responsible to “10” = most responsible)
(1) U.S. government or federal agency
(2) Independent, or non-governmental organizations
(3) Private corporations and industry trade groups
(4) Individual consumers53
Policy Opinion Measures
The non-regulatory policy indicator included the following two items:
(1) More experts should be recruited to evaluate GMOs.
(2) The U.S. should continue to support investments in biotechnology research.
The regulatory policy indicator included the following two items:
(5) There should be more control over GMOs.
(6) All genetically modified goods must be labeled.
Manipulation Check
Do you think this message came from a group in favor or opposed to biotechnology
and genetically modified foods?54
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